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A Strategic Approach to Social Accountability in Pakistan 
Tom Kirk 
 
Summary  
This paper explores the progress of the Empowerment, Voice and Accountability for Better 
Health and Nutrition (EVA) project implemented by Palladium in partnership with the Centre 
for Communications Programmes Pakistan. EVA aims to empower, organise and facilitate 
Pakistan’s citizens to hold the provincial governments of Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 
(KP) to account for the delivery of quality reproductive, maternal, new-born, child health and 
nutrition services (RMNCH-N). The paper situates the project within contemporary 
understandings of social accountability programming, and examines its approach to 
operationalising an adaptive, politically savvy and locally led way of working in a challenging 
context. It also comments upon the foundations of EVA’s early successes and its potential 
future directions as a way of offering guidance for similar projects. 
 
EVA is a five-year project (2014–19) with a budget of £18.85m funded by the UK 
Department for International Development (DFID) in Pakistan. The project is a component of 
DFID Pakistan’s flagship maternal and child health project ‘The Provincial Health & Nutrition 
Programme’. 
 
Keywords: social accountability; Pakistan; voice; mobilisation; adaptive. 
 
 
Tom Kirk is a PhD candidate at the London School of Economics and Political Science and 
the Director of Ekatay, a development consultancy. Interests include the provision of security 
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Key terms 
 
Diagonal accountability: When citizens involve themselves in the state’s horizontal 
accountability institutions, such as through participation within state mandated or funded 
health users’ committees. 
 
Horizontal accountability: State institutions monitoring and sanctioning one another, as 
with ombudsmen or human rights commissions. 
 
Political settlement: The informal agreement between elites as to how power, opportunities 
and services are to be distributed. 
 
Social accountability: An ongoing and collective effort to hold public officials to account for 
the provision of public goods, such as health and education services. 
 
Social contract: The obligations citizens and states consent to, to ensure a rule-governed 
society and the legitimacy of authorities.  
 
Vertical accountability: A focus on citizens’ ability to raise their voice and sanction elected 
representatives and governance institutions through formal democratic processes such as 
elections and complaint mechanisms, or through informal pressure such as lobbying or 
protests.  
 
 
Key lessons 
 
 EVA has mobilised citizens and built relationships at multiple levels of Pakistan’s 
governance architecture, and it has had several successes that tentatively suggest its 
approach to social accountability will bear significant fruit in the long run. 
 The project’s evolving model accords with recent literature that argues ‘strategic’ 
approaches which deploy multiple tactics, vertically integrate monitoring and advocacy 
efforts, coordinate citizens’ voice with ongoing state-based reforms, and foster 
enabling environments are key to supporting transitions towards social accountability 
in difficult contexts.  
 Nonetheless, from its outset, EVA has faced several contextually specific challenges; 
to overcome them it has mainstreamed the principles of adaptive, politically smart and 
locally led programming. Regular political economy analyses, some flexible budgeting, 
and a willingness to continuously question its theory of change are the cornerstones of 
this approach. 
 In this, EVA has benefited from support from its counterparts in DFID and the wider 
Provincial Health and Nutrition Programme framework. Indeed, a joined-up approach 
that draws on each organisation’s strengths has led to several recent developments 
with the potential to institutionalise accountability relationships.  
 EVA’s experiences suggest that social accountability programmes require the time and 
space to gradually scale up, should not limit themselves to ‘vertical’ accountability, and 
should be encouraged to demonstrate their impact through innovative methods. To 
support this, donors may have to re-think what denotes ‘success’ within programmes, 
with particular attention given to what takes place in the margins, and how they can 
support wider enabling environments for accountability. 
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1 An introduction to EVA 
 
Begun in 2014, EVA aims to empower, organise and facilitate citizens and civil society to 
hold the provincial governments of Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) to account for the 
delivery of quality reproductive, maternal, new-born, child health and nutrition (RMNCH-N) 
services. It is part of DFID’s Provincial Health and Nutrition Programme (PHNP), which 
includes a Technical Resource Facility (TRF+) that provides advice to the two governments; 
and a conditional financial aid package of £130m tied to their achievement of disbursement 
linked indicators (DLIs). Together they aim to contribute towards Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) 2 (improved nutrition) and 3 (healthy lives and wellbeing) in Pakistan.  
 
For its part, EVA seeks to: (i) enhance communities’ understandings of their health rights and 
entitlements, and to increase their capacities to monitor the planning and delivery of 
services; (ii) organise communities to advocate for desired service provision and policy 
changes at the local, district and provincial levels; and (iii) engage and build relationships 
with key stakeholders around specific activities in order to implement them successfully, 
including broader changes that affect communities beyond those with which EVA directly 
works. The project also hopes that some of its activities will be adopted and sustained by the 
two provincial governments when it ends. This paper understands EVA’s activities as aimed 
at ‘social accountability’ or, put another way, as an ‘ongoing and collective effort to hold 
public officials to account for the provision of public goods’ (Joshi and Houtzager 2012). 
  
Although debate continues around the conditions that support social accountability, a broad 
range of activities – from social audits, protests and media campaigns, to citizens’ score 
cards, budget monitoring, public–private watchdogs and participatory policy design – fall 
under this label. For their justification they all point to evidence that suggests bringing 
powerholders, decision-making, and state institutions closer to empowered citizens can 
improve the efficacy of public services that contribute towards human development (Joshi 
and Moore 2004; Evans 2008; Faguet et al. 2015). In this sense, they are part of a wave of 
post-Washington consensus programmes that have sought ways to involve citizens and 
organised civil society in bottom-up efforts to encourage and, where possible, co-produce 
pro-poor governance (Carothers and de Gramont 2013).  
 
Building on experiences in Pakistan and elsewhere, EVA is structured around a model of 
social accountability that facilitates local community groups to raise issues and demands 
related to health, with a focus on RMNCH-N services. Its activities include training in 
community-based monitoring, and the use of this information to support direct advocacy 
efforts. When citizens’ demands cannot be resolved locally, they can be raised within district 
and provincial level forums in which community members, civil society activists, state 
representatives and EVA staff engage with one another. More broadly, the project works with 
Pakistan’s print and television media, and is building networks of journalists and religious 
leaders. These activities are designed to legitimise EVA’s activities, amplify the voices of its 
community groups, and to educate the wider population as to their rights and entitlements.1  
 
Although only over halfway through, EVA has built a range of structures and relationships, 
and has had several early successes (see Box 1.1) that tentatively suggest its approach to 
social accountability is ideally placed to bear significant fruit in the long-run. This paper 
unpacks the contemporary theoretical literature to cautiously attribute this to its use of a 
‘strategic’ model of social accountability, and to its ongoing efforts to institutionalise an 
‘enabling environment’ for responsive governance and productive citizen-state engagements 
(Fox 2015; Fox and Aceron 2016). At the same time, it shows how EVA benefits from the 
adoption of an ‘adaptive’, ‘politically smart’ and ‘locally led’ approach to programming that is 
                                                 
1  EVA also includes a fund to support innovative solutions for the better provision of RNMCH-N services. However, this 
paper is primarily concerned with EVA’s model of social accountability so it is not discussed. 
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increasingly championed as an alternative to mainstream ways of working in challenging 
contexts (Booth and Chambers 2014; Wild et al. 2015). The paper explores where these 
approaches have had traction and where they have encountered difficulties. And concludes 
with brief comments on what EVA’s experiences suggest for practitioners and donors in the 
wider social accountability field. 
 
Box 1.1: EVA’s early successes 
Although social accountability initiatives rarely show much in the way of measurable impact early 
on, and attribution presents a significant challenge, it is worth highlighting some of the emerging 
signs of EVA’s progress: 
 
 The initiative has facilitated 310 community groups, each with an average of 25 members, 
spread across nine districts in Punjab and KP. By the end of 2016 these groups had made 
3,585 demands. Of these, 1,328 (37 per cent) were resolved to the satisfaction of the groups.  
 An analysis of the media from a January 2015 baseline shows that the coverage of health 
stories in Pakistan had increased by 145 per cent by summer 2016. Of these, at least 230 print 
articles and television news segments are attributable to EVA-trained journalists.  
 In KP, EVA has been invited to help three district governments develop their health plans. 
These include funds allocated to the resolution of demands raised by EVA’s community 
groups. Furthermore, a ‘Patients’ Rights Charter’ outlining behavioural standards for health 
facility staff developed by EVA from its participants’ feedback has been adopted by KP’s 
Health Care Commission and will be mainstreamed throughout the province with EVA’s 
support. 
 EVA has built relationships with KP’s Independent Monitoring Unit – a public oversight body 
concerned with the quality of service provision by the health department. This relationship 
mainly involves the sharing of community-based monitoring data and other primary research 
from the project to add user perspectives to the available monitoring data. 
 Working with DFID and TRF+, EVA has persuaded the KP government to include the 
resolution of 40 per cent of the demands raised by its District Advocacy Forums (DAFs) within 
the provincial government’s 2016 DLIs for DFID funds. This DLI was met in early 2017 by the 
KP government. 
 
Nonetheless, before proceeding, two caveats must be made. Firstly, this paper is not a 
review of EVA or its impact. Rather, the aim is to situate the project within contemporary 
thinking around social accountability and ways of doing development that account for, and 
work with, political realities in challenging contexts.2 Secondly, reform efforts in ‘competitive 
clientelistic’ political systems, such as Pakistan, tend to be frustrating and unpredictable, and 
are likely to be characterised by fits and starts, with ‘islands of effectiveness’ in some sub-
national contexts and the marginalisation of others (Kelsall et al. 2016). Accordingly, the 
paper’s analysis and conclusions must be read against the risks of operating in such a 
context.3  
 
Research for this paper was carried out by the author – an independent consultant – with 
funding from Palladium in Pakistan over 40 days in 2016. It included a desk-based review of 
the literature on social accountability and EVA’s programme documentation, semi-structured 
in-depth interviews with programme and DFID staff, and interviews with organisations 
responsible for implementing the programme’s various components. Interviews and focus 
groups were also conducted with community group members in Peshawar, Nowshera, 
Lahore and Multan. Visits to community group meetings with local authorities were also 
conducted. Thanks go to those that gave their time to aid the research. Before examining the 
theoretical literature and EVA’s model, the paper turns to the contextual conditions for social 
accountability in Pakistan. 
 
                                                 
2  Based on the findings of this report the author has offered recommendations to EVA elsewhere.  
3  Predicating the direction of social accountability initiatives in challenging contexts reminds one of Donald Rumsfeld’s 
famous comments on ‘known unknowns’ and ‘unknown unknowns’.  
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2  The political economy of service delivery 
in Pakistan 
 
To put the PHNP and EVA’s aims into context: in 2012 approximately 12,000, or 332 per 
1,000, Pakistani women died in labour, making complications during pregnancy the leading 
cause of death in women aged 15–45 years (Bhutta and Hafeez 2015). Partially accounting 
for this, it is estimated that more than 60 per cent of births take place without a skilled birth 
attendant. For the same year it was shown that for every 1,000 live births, 87 children died 
before their fifth birthday (USAID 2012). Perhaps indicative of the causes, one in every five 
children nationally are not immunised, whilst in rural areas this figure stands at two in every 
three. Figures also suggest that 44 per cent of Pakistani children under five suffer from 
chronic undernutrition (UNDP 2014). Adding to these issues, research has shown that 
Pakistani teenage girls often have no knowledge of contraceptives and, in part owing to 
conservative cultural norms, many that marry immediately fall pregnant.4 
 
As DFID’s business case for EVA-BHN also declared, the ‘costs and loss of earnings 
associated with catastrophic illness are the major cause of families falling into poverty’ in 
Pakistan (DFID 2012: 2). In particular, the negative impacts of maternal mortality on new-
borns’ health and survival, family functioning, educational attainment and livelihoods has 
long been recognised (WHO 2006; Miller and Belizán 2015). Encouragingly, however, 
evidence from developed and developing countries, including Pakistan, suggests that early 
interventions aimed at maternal and nutritional care are beneficial both for the longer term 
development of children and for states seeking cost effective policies (Young and 
Richardson 2007; Gowani et al. 2014; Yousafzai et al. 2014).  
 
Although there is a growing private health sector in Pakistan, for the majority cheap, efficient 
and accessible state services would be beneficial. This is especially the case for the third of 
Pakistanis thought to live in poverty and the 64 per cent of the population that reside in rural 
areas. However, the nation’s health budget has historically received less than 1 per cent of 
gross domestic product (GDP), which must be allocated among a growing and urbanising 
population (Bhutta and Hafeez 2015). Much of it is spent on tertiary health facilities, such as 
hospitals, in populous areas, leaving limited funds for primary care through Rural Health 
Centres and Basic Health Units (BHUs).5 The lack of a serious holistic approach to family 
planning by successive national and provincial level governments eager to pass the buck 
has also been highlighted (Zafar and Shaikh 2014).  
 
Below the national level, the politics of service delivery in Pakistan also arguably remains 
characterised by patron-client relations. Indeed, despite its growing, urban middle class, 
Pakistan has been described as in the grip of an informal ‘mafia’ politics (Nelson 2016).6 This 
places a system of intermediaries between citizens and state services, and enables powerful 
individuals to use them to reward allies and punish opponents (Martin 2015). At the same 
time, the relative isolation of rural communities, hidden dependencies, such as status 
inequalities or indebtedness, and the political protection of poorly performing health workers 
reduce citizens’ avenues for complaint or redress (Shami 2012; Callen et al. 2013; Chaudhry 
and Vyborny 2013). Perhaps unsurprisingly, research reports a widespread perception 
                                                 
4  See Ebrahim (2014). 
5  Pakistan’s flagship healthcare initiative at the primary level is the Lady Health Workers programme. However, it has 
been criticised for not reaching the poorest and for a lack of focus on RMNCH issues (Bhutta and Hafeez 2015; 
Ghaffar et al. 2015). 
6  As both Nelson (2016) and Martin (2015) suggest, rapid urbanisation and a move away from dependence on 
agriculture is undoubtedly changing traditional patronage dynamics, but this may not be in a direction that is 
conducive to democracy or accountable service delivery. This is also why it is not accurate to describe contemporary 
Pakistan as a ‘feudal’ society (Mohmand 2011).  
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among ordinary people that health services are poor, inaccessible or, simply, not for them 
(Mumtaz et al. 2013; Riaz et al. 2015). 
   
In many respects, the division of responsibility for health services reflects this politics. For 
example, since the turn of the century multiple state institutions have been charged with 
monitoring service provision and uncovering corruption (TRF 2010). Many of these, however, 
have not been given adequate resources to pursue their mandates, are muzzled when they 
have targeted influential powerholders or have historically been used to pursue political 
rivalries.7 Mechanisms that could connect citizens to provincial institutions, such as the 
Punjab and KP Health Care Commissions, have also struggled to stake out their remits as 
other concerns dominate. At the same time, ministers, officials and advisors are regularly 
moved or replaced as political contests dictate; an occurrence that leaves little room for the 
reform-minded to oversee long-term plans. 
  
The cultivation of an empowered and politically active citizenry also faces numerous 
obstacles. These include legislation that bans some forms of political organising, rigorous 
state monitoring of civil society organisations and, in recent history, violence wrought against 
well-known activists. Furthermore, Pakistan remains culturally conservative, with many 
groups holding social and religious norms that dissuade regular participation in the public 
sphere, especially among women, marginalised groups or lower castes.8 Non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) that engage in advocacy can be viewed with suspicion and even 
subject to state-action, especially if they receive international funding or are perceived to be 
pushing a liberal agenda.    
 
Nevertheless, those seeking accountable governance may be emboldened by Pakistan’s 
ongoing democratising project. For instance, the 2013 elections witnessed a 15 per cent 
increase in voter turnout and the country’s first hand over of power from one civilian 
government to another after a period of military rule (1999–2008).9 Furthermore, a 
devolution plan was set in motion that year which has accorded significant powers, including 
over health management and spending, to the federation’s four provinces and led to local 
government elections.10 These developments have ridden a wave of increased political 
competition and civil society activity, with a proliferation of independent media organisations 
over the last decade and mass protests to reinstate Pakistan’s deposed Chief Justice from 
2007 to 2009. The monopoly of the country’s older dynastic political parties has also been 
challenged by the electoral gains made by Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf’s (PTI) anti-corruption 
message, and a rising public discourse around topics such as Pakistan’s ‘VIP culture’ and 
the civil-military balance of power is increasingly dominating headlines. 
 
It is also notable that in the run up to the 2013 elections Pakistan’s major political parties 
included promises on health provision in their manifestos. For example, the Pakistan Muslim 
League-Nawaz (PML-N) vowed to increase health spending as a proportion of GDP to 2 per 
cent and to introduce a National Health Service which aims to, amongst other things, 
achieve a 100 per cent increase in the vaccination of children and a 50 per cent reduction in 
infant and child mortality (PML-N 2013). Whilst the insurgent PTI ran a campaign that framed 
previous governments’ health policies as ‘for the elite, with people missing from the 
equation’.11 It also promised to increase spending as a proportion of GDP to 2.6 per cent and 
to bring about a 100 per cent increase in health services coverage (PTI 2013). Such pledges 
represent a new battleground for this generation of Pakistani politicians. Yet, at the time of 
                                                 
7  For a good overview see Khan (2016). 
8  In some areas, Pakistan retains a caste system comparable to India, with groups denoted by a mix of kinship and 
profession. 
9  Pakistan has been under military rule three times in its short history (1958–71, 1977–88, and 1999–2008). Previous 
civilian governments were either abolished by military coups, prevented from seeing out their terms in office by 
emergency provisions, or had their leaders dismissed.  
10  The legislative groundwork for decentralisation was set by the 18th Constitutional Amendment in 2010. 
11  See DAWN (2012). 
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writing, observers are unsure whether this will lead to better services or merely overtly 
politicise provision.12 
  
Within this context, some international organisations and aid agencies have been working 
towards strengthening substantive democracy and accountability. Many of their projects 
were initially instigated under General Musharraf who was keen to position himself as pro-
Western. Whilst other projects have been undertaken in response to the Pakistani Taliban’s 
insurgency from 2007–09 that was partially considered to be the result of poor citizen–state 
relations in KP and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) (GoP 2010). Notable 
among these are the Supporting Transparency, Accountability and Electoral Process in 
Pakistan (STAEP) (2011–14) project that raised 200 citizens’ advocacy groups to secure 
‘More effective, transparent, and accountable governance that addresses the critical 
challenges facing Pakistan today’,13 and the AAWAZ programme (2012–17) that works in 
4500 communities towards a ‘a strengthened, stable, inclusive and tolerant democracy’.14 In 
many respects, EVA has learnt from and hopes to build on these efforts. Before exploring its 
progress, the paper now turns to the contemporary literature on social accountability 
projects.    
 
 
3 Social accountability: from tools to social 
contracts 
 
In a recent paper on social accountability projects, Fox (2015) argues that calls for an 
expanded evidence base as to ‘what works’ are largely misguided. His counter-intuitive 
argument is based on evidence that the context is as important, if not more important than, 
the types of accountability tools projects adopt (O’Neil et al. 2007; O’Meally 2013; Hickey 
and King 2016). And it is supported by re-readings of influential impact evaluations that 
suggest that practitioners often miss or overlook the unique contextual factors that lead to or 
block accountability (Olken 2007; Banerjee et al. 2010). In response, Fox concludes that we 
need deeper analytical concepts and tools to understand projects’ prospects – including 
questioning what should be considered a success – in any given context. 
  
To begin to answer his own call, Fox (2015) distinguishes between ‘tactical’ and ‘strategic’ 
social accountability projects. Tactical projects are bounded interventions that assume 
citizens will be spurred into collective action by the provision of information on the 
performance of those governing them. Thus, they are limited to society- or demand-side 
efforts to amplify citizens’ voices and often focus on specific accountability tools, such as 
citizens’ score cards or participatory budgeting. In contrast, strategic approaches 'deploy 
multiple tactics, encourage enabling environments for collective action for accountability and 
coordinate the raising of citizens’ voices with governmental reforms’ (Fox 2015: 346).15 
 
Strategic projects are posited as more promising than tactical projects because they work on 
both vertical accountability or citizens’ ‘voice’, and the mechanisms and institutions able to 
sanction underperforming service providers, which Fox terms ‘teeth’. This often involves the 
use of coordinated tactics, as in efforts to combine media campaigns and information on 
service provision with trainings to civil society organisations. And it necessitates the creation 
                                                 
12  Whilst revising this paper, Pakistan’s Prime Minister was compelled to stand down from office due to allegations of 
his involvement with off shore tax avoidance schemes. Although this appears to represent a step up in the power and 
independence of the judiciary, as is usual, rumours abound that it may simply be indicative of the enduring ability of 
Pakistan’s ‘deep-state’ to trump democracy as and when it desires. 
13 DFID (2011). 
14  AAWAZ Voice and Accountability Programme, http://aawaz.org.pk/ (accessed 1 October 2016)  
15  It should be noted that this is very different to calls for projects to be conducted at scale from early on in their cycles. 
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of linked citizen–state interfaces at multiple governance levels, such as with frontline service 
providers, departments responsible for service delivery and national oversight institutions 
(Fox and Aceron 2016). Fox’s (2015) review of the existing evidence base suggests that 
these ‘sandwich strategies’ can provide ‘bite’, address common problems such as initiatives’ 
unintended displacement of corruption or rent seeking activities, and support the 
institutionalisation of new accountability mechanisms (see Box 3.1). 
 
Box 3.1: Citizen–health provider interfaces in Uganda 
Repeated studies of a social accountability initiative in Uganda that used community-based 
monitoring tools illustrate how information on service provision, opportunities for citizens to engage 
service providers, and local ownership of monitoring processes had long-run effects on the quality 
of health care (Björkman and Svensson 2009; Nyqvist et al. 2014). Crucially, the initiative involved 
NGOs facilitating ‘interface meetings’ between communities and those responsible for local health 
services. During these meetings citizens’ rights were discussed and information on the providers’ 
performance shared. ‘Community contracts’ that outlined how services would be improved going 
forward and a strategy for how the community could monitor progress towards them were 
negotiated.  
 
The initiative’s’ impact included a reduction in infant mortality (33 per cent), the increased use of 
outpatient services (20 per cent) and overall improvements in health treatment practices. The 
follow-up study documents show that positive outcomes were sustained for four years after the 
initiative.  
 
At their core, strategic social accountability projects are focused on cultivating synergistic 
relationships between state and society. They aim to kick-start long-running virtuous cycles 
within which actors and institutions from each sphere compliment one another’s efforts to 
realise citizens’ rights and reform state institutions.16 The literature is, however, ambivalent 
about the appropriate balance between a focus on the short route to accountability as an 
immediate expression of ‘client power’ in-between elections, and the long route to 
accountability’s use of political pressures to institutionalise accountability relationships. 
Indeed, it suggests that this can only been discerned through a hard-earned familiarity with 
each context. 
 
Yet, as we have seen, in countries such as Pakistan power is routinely exercised through 
informal means, such as hidden dependencies, status inequalities or clientelist politics. 
Moreover, obstacles to accountability often stem from a country’s underlying ‘political 
settlement’; understood as an informal agreement between elites for how power and 
opportunities are to be distributed (Khan 2010; Laws 2012). This challenges practitioners to 
acquire fine-grained and up-to-date understandings of the contexts within which they work. 
To do this, it is increasingly argued that regular political economy analyses (PEAs) and 
‘causal-chain’ approaches can help practitioners to think through the various steps of their 
projects’ theories of change (Menocal and Sharma 2008; Joshi 2014).  
 
These exercises often reveal that projects may also have to work on supporting an ‘enabling 
environment’ for accountability (Fox 2015). Such environments give citizens’ reasons to 
believe that the benefits of challenging the status quo outweigh the potential costs. This is 
crucial because the decisions, actions and risks citizens that raise their voice face vary from 
country to country, province to province, or, even from village to village. For example, studies 
of India’s right to information laws have shown that voice can be fatal in some contexts, 
whilst in others it can expedite access to welfare programmes (Peisakhin and Pinto 2010; 
Pande 2014). At the same time, powerholders’ willingness to respond to citizens’ issues 
differ. Some may be incentivised by reforms that stand to materially benefit themselves or 
                                                 
16  It is notable that an interest in state-society synergy grew from responses to the popularisation of the idea of ‘social 
capital’. Scholars used historical readings to highlight mutually supportive interactions and accommodations between 
the state, and civil and political society (Heller 1996; Evans 1996). 
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their supporter base, whilst others are motivated by informal norms or political motives 
(Hickey 2012).17 
 
Understanding social accountability projects as, in part, (re)negotiations of a country’s ‘social 
contract’ is one way of exploring enabling environments (Joshi and Houtzager 2012; Hickey 
and King 2016). Indeed, social contract theory suggests accountability projects should be as 
much about fostering societal discourses around citizen’s entitlements, the state’s 
obligations and its legitimacy, as they are about the technical tools of accountability, 
information, and institutional reforms. Projects, therefore, should seek opportunities to create 
room for public deliberations around services, citizenship and rights, and seize opportunities 
to politicise citizens’ demands and issues.18 This is not to suggest that accountability is 
merely a question of awareness raising. Rather, it is an acknowledgement that a project’s 
success is often grounded in informal social norms, public discourses, power and politics. 
 
The next section illustrates how EVA accords with a strategic approach to social 
accountability, whilst seeking to support an enabling environment for citizen–state 
negotiations over the provision of health services. 
 
 
4 EVA’s ‘strategic’ model of social 
accountability 
 
Figure 4.1: EVA’s model of social accountability 
 
Source: EVA (reproduced with kind permission of EVA staff). 
 
                                                 
17  Hickey and King (2016) argue that awareness of how social norms and political ideologies shape social 
accountability initiatives directly challenges the rational actor and principal-agent frameworks favoured by 
mainstream development.   
18  De Waal's (1996) study of food security in Africa and India suggests popular mobilisations can create the space for 
negotiations over the formalisation of social contracts as constitutional commitments. 
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EVA’s model of social accountability is designed to mirror the provinces’ governance 
architectures. Beginning at the union council level (the lowest administrative level in 
Pakistan), it comprises of monthly meetings of its community groups. Through community-
based monitoring and regular consultations, these citizens identify issues and demands 
related to services at their local health facilities that are taken directly to the staff or local 
government bodies.  
 
To provide interfaces with district administrations, EVA has also established DAFs. They are 
small squads of committed accountability champions nominated from the projects’ 
community groups, influential members of civil society, and representatives from NGOs.  
They take up difficult community group demands, and use their skills and networks to 
strategise paths to their resolution. 
 
Lastly, the project’s Provisional Advocacy Forums (PAFs) represent the top tier of state–
society interfaces. Twice a year, they bring community representatives, civil society 
members, and programme staff into contact with provincial level bureaucrats, health-care 
contractors, and politicians. They discuss issues that cannot be resolved by community 
groups or DAFs, with a focus on those that require new policy directions. This structure is 
complimented by ad hoc meetings and interactions between programme staff and 
powerholders at all administrative levels. 
 
5  Civic mobilisation 
 
EVA began its civic mobilisation efforts by mapping who was already working towards the 
public good in its project districts. Indeed, staff were keen not to create parallel structures. 
This enabled EVA to capitalise on the legitimacy of existing community groups, many of 
which were established by ongoing or retired development projects. Through local 
informants it also uncovered a variety of influential actors, including lawyers, journalists, 
union heads, professional associations, and religious leaders, that were invited to participate 
in DAFs. 
  
Due to the monetisation of civil society activity in Pakistan, persuading citizens of the 
projects’ worth without offering the payments or ‘per diems’ expected of foreign funded 
projects sometimes proved difficult (Bano 2008). Furthermore, although the idea of 
participatory development is widespread, social accountability or direct advocacy is relatively 
unheard of, particularly in the health sector. These obstacles were often overcome by 
explaining EVA’s focus on the realisation of existing rights and entitlements, and its long-
term goal to create sustainable, citizen-owned structures. For some, this was taken as a new 
and exciting mode of working for the public good. Whilst for others, it was interpreted as a 
return to a style of activism last seen during the 1970s when Pakistan was home to several 
social movements and leftist parties. And, for a small number, the opportunity to use EVA’s 
platforms to work towards their own, often political goals, was the real draw.  
 
In this way, EVA acknowledges that it cannot avoid local politics. Indeed, as elsewhere the 
line between civil society activism – commonly called ‘social work’ in Pakistan – and politics 
is often blurred, with some individuals using the former as a stepping stone into the latter 
(Kirk 2014). Rather than trying to ignore this, the project actively encourages these members 
to add their skills and connections to their groups’ efforts. Some groups even purposefully 
invite relatives of powerholders or those recently elected to local bodies to join them. This 
marks a significant change for donor projects in Pakistan which have historically been wary 
of engaging citizens or groups considered to be ‘political’.  
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However, as studies of decentralisation and participatory development have highlighted, the 
inclusion of politically ambitious or connected group citizens raises the issue of elite capture 
(Mansuri and Rao 2004; Acemoglu et al. 2014). To mitigate this, EVA’s community groups 
elect coordinators that attend bi-monthly ‘check-in meetings’ at which they record identified 
issues, report their monitoring results, and discuss advocacy strategies. The project also 
conducted research into the socioeconomic compositions of the groups and has found that 
64 per cent of their members were likely to be ‘poor or very poor’. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that by not paying participants, those uninterested in accountability soon leave. 
 
EVA actively seeks to include the poor and marginalised, including women, religious 
minorities and lower castes, in its activities. Nonetheless, other members sometimes resist 
the inclusion of these groups, arguing that they do not want to sit with them or that their 
issues should not be accorded special status. Whilst, for their part, the marginalised often 
believe that powerholders are disinterested in their concerns or that they will face additional 
problems if they are part of a group that challenges the status quo. 
 
To address such obstacles EVA adopts two strategies. Firstly, it is unafraid to acknowledge 
these groups’ marginalisation, instead reframing them as potentially powerful social blocks 
for change. And secondly, it is sensitive to cultural norms that cannot be overcome within the 
project’s lifespan. Crucial to this approach is the involvement of community members with 
the legitimacy to introduce the poor and marginalised to the project’s aims. For example, in 
the EVA’s second year a lack of women in its community groups was addressed through a 
recruitment drive that leveraged existing members’ kinship networks, leading to a significant 
increase in women’s participation both as ordinary members and in leadership roles. Whilst, 
in KP a well-known madrassa teacher, who the project has engaged, has encouraged 
potential participants to view the project’s activities as akin to Islam’s instructions to raise 
your voice for the collective good.  
 
EVA, therefore, is both empowering citizens that may not have been politically active before, 
and drawing upon the skills and networks already present within the communities it engages. 
The effectiveness of this strategy for civic mobilisation in Pakistan’s challenging context is 
reflected in the second year’s findings that 21 per cent and 40 per cent of community group 
members in Punjab and KP respectively have attended more than three meetings. Indeed, 
EVA has built a pool of committed activists who can be called upon to take up local issues or 
to represent communities at the district level. 
 
6  Citizen–state interfaces 
 
Civic mobilisation is only one of the ‘levers’ of social accountability (Grandvoinnet et al. 
2015). An active citizenry also requires opportunities to engage those responsible for service 
delivery. EVA provides three forums for such engagements. The community groups and 
DAFs are where much of the activity takes place. However, outside of these opportunities, 
citizens form teams to pursue identified demands and strengthen their relationships with 
powerholders. This section argues that these activities are showing signs of changing 
citizen–state relationships in the project’s districts.  
 
Community group meetings and regular monitoring of BHUs provides opportunities for 
members to form relationships with the facilities’ staff. Although they can initially be hesitant 
about sharing access and information, or about the prospect of angry community members, 
many soften once they learn that the project is locally led by volunteers and endorsed by 
state officials. Over time, some BHUs and their staff are even beginning to see the project’s 
community groups as allies in their own struggles with district or provincial level authorities. 
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This is well illustrated by a case in which members helped a BHU to retrieve a generator that 
had been misappropriated by a district level official.19 
 
EVA project staff argue that that the most important moment for challenging traditional 
citizen–state relationships is the first time a community group has one of its demands 
resolved (see Box 6.1). Following this, the group’s attitude often changes, with members 
beginning to view local health facilities and their staff as one of the community’s assets. 
Furthermore, many are beginning to organise themselves to maintain their BHUs, undertake 
small renovation projects, and to monitor the facilities outside of the project’s routine checks. 
 
Box 6.1: Citizen’s demands 
One-fifth of the demands (19 per cent) raised during EVA’s second year in Punjab and one-third 
(32 per cent) in KP concerned infrastructure at health facilities. Ten per cent of demands in Punjab 
and 12 per cent in KP focused on the availability of medicines at health facilities. Ten per cent of 
demands in Punjab and 11 per cent in KP were about the placement or availability of staff. The 
remainder of the demands have been about issues such as the cleanliness of facilities, or the need 
for ambulances and complaints boxes.  
 
Whilst many of the more day-to-day issues at BHUs can be resolved at the community group 
level, others necessitate groups to call on the support and influence of DAF members (see 
Box 6.2). These members often have pre-existing relationships with district level officials that 
they can leverage to get things done. For example, in one district a DAF member is a well-
known journalist used to engaging local officials and politicians. Whilst in another, a 
particularly active member is a lawyer whose work requires him to regularly meet with district 
level officials. In this way, EVA’s strategic model of social accountability leverages the 
experiences, skills and networks of citizens at various levels of Pakistan’s governance 
architecture. 
 
Box 6.2: Immunisation in Layyah 
In the initiative’s second year, a man from a lower caste family in Southern Punjab visited his local 
BHU to vaccinate his recently born child; a free service committed to under Pakistan’s Expanded 
Program on Immunisation. He was informed, however, that all the supplies had been used for that 
day and he should seek a private provider.  
 
Given previous bad experiences of services at the facility, the husband suspected he was being 
misinformed. Using knowledge from his participation in EVA’s local community group, he informed 
the BHU’s staff that he was fully aware of his entitlements and demanded to see a register of who 
had been vaccinated that day.  
 
Following this incident, the husband returned to the BHU with his community group’s coordinator. 
After much discussion, they were promised a vaccination in the coming days. However, the 
vaccination was blocked by the BHU clerk who was locally influential. 
 
Realising that the best course of action would be to go public, community group members, DAF 
members and EVA project staff, organised a small protest outside the local Press Club. They also 
jointly presented a written complaint to the district official responsible for health services. The 
vaccination was eventually carried out later and the clerk apologised to the EVA community group. 
 
The community group and BHU staff are reported to now maintain good relations.  
 
As powerholders have begun to trust the DAFs, the nature of their relationships with them 
has also changed. For example, in one district, health officials recently approached DAF 
                                                 
19  See Palladium (2016a).  
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members for help in securing local government funds for the appointment of a 
neurosurgeon. Members helped them to negotiate with the district’s Finance and Planning 
Department, and eventually the funds were approved. This interaction led to the officials’ 
regular attendance at subsequent DAF meetings. Interactions such as this have even led 
district level officials and politicians to describe EVA’s groups as their eyes and ears on the 
ground. 
 
A recent review of 37 social accountability projects that sought to improve the provision of 
health services in 15 middle- and low-income countries reflects EVA’s early experiences 
(Lodenstein et al. 2017). It found that health officials’ receptivity to citizens’ demands is 
dependent on their perceptions of the legitimacy of the groups engaging them. This can be 
improved by groups that are willing to work with them to solve issues, including co-producing 
services and helping them to articulate their own problems to higher authorities.  At the same 
time, forums for citizen–state interfaces within which officials feel ‘safe’, with opportunities to 
defend themselves or be rewarded for positive actions, were argued to be central to 
sustaining collaborative relationships. 
 
Nonetheless, for intractable issues, EVA’s bi-annual PAFs provide spaces in which 
significant political pressure can be applied or new policy directions discussed. For example, 
the Punjab’s PAF recently raised the issue of a half built medical college in Sahiwal district 
with the Chief Minister’s (CM) Health Advisor. Somewhat put on the spot, he promised to 
finish the college and assured PAF members of its functionality within two months. The 
presence of influential journalists and advocates was argued by EVA staff to be instrumental 
to the Advisor’s swift response.  
 
Yet, PAFs serve three broader purposes. Firstly, they give officials and politicians a sense of 
the ‘pubic pulse’ around health provision. This is achieved through the presentation of EVA’s 
top-line BHU community monitoring data and analysis of demands raised by community 
groups. Secondly, they allow EVA project staff to elicit the support of senior officials and 
politicians for their wider activities, such as securing the attendance of district officials at 
DAFs or learning of opportunities for the project to work with emerging accountability 
institutions. Lastly, they provide a platform upon which to build wider coalitions among 
stakeholders who may rarely meet, who may work at cross-purposes or, in some cases, 
have fractious relations. 
 
This last role was demonstrated during the second meeting of the Punjab’s PAF in late 2015 
during which five Members of the Provincial Assembly (MPAs) from EVA’s project districts 
were put on the same platform as the CM’s Health Advisor. Backed up by civil society 
representatives, the MPAs used this opportunity to raise the common belief that funding for 
their constituencies’ BHUs is routinely delayed because they do not have powerful Members 
of the National Assembly (MNAs) in their districts. In response, the CM’s Health Advisor 
declared he would ask the Health Department to resolve the MPAs’ issues. It is in this sense 
that EVA’s senior staff view the PAFs as providing a ‘third model of accountability’, able to 
exploit the opportunities created by Pakistan’s ongoing democratising project and the 
tentative revival of its civil society.20  
 
Whilst this paper was being written, the Punjab’s PAF had two additional significant 
successes. Firstly, it was involved in the formation of a cross-party Health Caucus in the 
Provincial Assembly. This is enabling the escalation of citizens’ demands to policy circles. 
And, secondly, politicians that attend the PAF were instrumental in the notification of the 
rules of the 2012 Breastfeeding and Infant Child Feeding Act – an Act which had lain 
dormant for four years and which was highlighted at Punjab PAF meetings through issues 
identified by citizens. 
                                                 
20  Among Pakistan’s NGO community and development workers, the idea that civil society is currently enjoying a 
tentative revival often arises from contrasts between now, and the restrictions and co-optations experienced under 
military governments. 
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7  Information 
 
Although the theoretical literature no longer considers information to be the silver bullet that 
it once did, EVA still accords its generation and dissemination a key role within its model of 
social accountability. Most notably, it uses community-based monitoring as a means through 
which to gather information on service provision and to bolster the project’s advocacy efforts 
at all governance levels. As this section shows, however, it takes steps to assure that the 
information that is generated is aligned with supply side developments and useful to those 
receiving it.  
 
During the design of its community-based monitoring tool, EVA was careful to consult widely 
among government departments and programmes responsible for health services. This 
included engaging the Policy and Strategic Planning Unit (PSPU) in Punjab and the Health 
Sector Reform Unit (HSRU) in KP who have significant experience of using data to support 
governance reforms. A capacity assessment also led to trainings at the DAF level that 
enable members to use data to support their demands and to illustrate wider issues. Their 
worth has been demonstrated through EVA’s use of data to highlight a lack of ambulances at 
BHUs in the Punjab and subsequent commitments to address this issue from provincial level 
authorities.  
 
The capacity of civil society to use data in advocacy efforts is growing in importance as the 
two provinces’ governments increasingly adopt evidence based policy making principles; a 
turn that has arisen from a combination of donor funded projects, such as the DFID 
supported ‘Roadmaps for Health and Education’, and the championing of performance 
related incentive schemes by Punjab’s CM. Indeed, civil society requires the capacity to both 
monitor these schemes and to support them with its own data and analyses. As a step in this 
direction, EVA’s reports are being shared with the KP’s Independent Monitoring Unit (IMU), 
with selected data from the project presented to Ministers at quarterly stocktake meetings. 
This adds users’ perspectives to their policy discussions. 
 
It is in this sense that EVA also sees itself as providing information on the everyday struggles 
of ordinary service users and of the political determinants of poor provision. Indeed, the 
DAFs and PAFs provide opportunities for community members’ stories to be voiced in front 
of high ranking officials, thereby, adding an important human element to the data they 
receive. Looking ahead, EVA staff have raised the possibility of its data and stories being 
used by journalists and civil society organisations to illustrate the political causes of, and 
trends in, inequitable service delivery; something which governmental organisations such as 
the IMU or PSPU are not mandated, and are politically unable, to do. 
 
8  An enabling environment for accountability 
 
As we have seen, it is increasingly argued that social accountability projects in challenging 
contexts may have to work towards the creation of an enabling environment. This involves 
citizens feeling able and safe to engage in public deliberations around the provision of public 
goods; something that can be interpreted as an ongoing renegotiation of a nation’s 
underlying social contracts. 
 
To do this, EVA works with Pakistan’s print and television media, and is building networks of 
journalists and religious leaders. These networks disseminate information on service 
provision and the performance of state institutions, and create space for wider debates over 
rights and entitlements, including the pledges and promises of politicians. They also go 
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some way towards legitimising EVA’s activities among a public and state sceptical of donor-
funded initiatives. Nonetheless, evidence suggests that in many contexts the first step in 
such efforts is often to educate journalists and other opinion formers as to the existing 
responsibilities of the state and to their own role as society’s watchdog (Odugbemi and Lee 
2011).  
 
To this end, by mid-2016, EVA had trained and supported 22 journalists to use a ‘rights-
based’ approach to health reporting, and equipped them with strategies to persuade editors, 
bureau chiefs and outlet owners that health stories can draw audiences (see Box 8.1). The 
need to work on these two aspects of Pakistan’s vast media sector were uncovered during 
consultations with leading industry figures. They argued that although it is professionalising, 
it is only just beginning to emerge from a long period within which entertainment and 
sensationalism trumped rigorous and objective analyses, particularly of social issues such as 
health and education.  
 
Box 8.1: A rights-based approach to reporting on health stories 
To support health journalists, EVA produced a handbook outlining a ‘rights based’ approach to 
reporting. Broadly viewed, the approach has five core principles – participation, accountability, non-
discrimination, empowerment, and linkages to international and Pakistani human rights’ standards. 
 
Trainings in the approach include sessions on citizens’ rights and entitlements; an understanding of 
the role of media in efforts to hold service providers to account; and best practices to ensure stories 
cover the voices of all concerned stakeholders. Furthermore, given the low knowledge of rights, 
especially among marginalised communities, the trainings also focus on how stories can educate 
readers.  
 
This approach is well illustrated by stories subsequently produced by EVA trained journalists that 
seek out both those affected by poor services and those responsible for their provision. Indeed, as 
commented upon by one trainee, following the training his stories aim for ‘a 360 degrees view’ that 
draws in a number of voices. The goal is twofold: to raise awareness around an issue and to put 
pressure on duty bearers to act to improve services, thus holding them to account.  
 
The project is currently working to institutionalise the handbook in a curriculum designed for 
universities in Pakistan teaching journalism courses. 
 
Alongside its journalist network, EVA seeks to enliven the public discourse around the 
accountability of Pakistan’s health services through political discussion shows and 
education-entertainment. The former includes a collaboration with Dawn (a major news 
network) on a series of five district-based television talk shows and three early morning 
shows aired as part of a campaign entitled ‘My Health, My Right’. These shows included 
segments in which Ministers and officials from both provinces outlined their policies related 
to RMNCH-N services and responded to criticisms from other participants, including 
journalists and representatives of opposition parties. Furthermore, in a new development for 
such shows, EVA worked with producers to ensure that they covered the everyday provision 
of services at BHUs, with segments devoted to nutrition, community outreach workers, the 
Health Department’s policies for hiring, cleanliness, and mechanisms for grievance redress; 
something which is often overlooked in the media’s desire for scandal and sensationalism. 
 
In terms of entertainment-education, EVA has developed a television film and two drama 
serials focussed on citizens’ rights and accountability. Broadly understood, entertainment-
education involves embedding or wrapping up educational messaging in entertainment. The 
general idea is to introduce audiences to beneficial information and behaviours in accessible 
formats, and through stories that contain characters or situations that resonate with their 
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everyday lives.21 For example, one of the in-production serials includes a storyline that 
highlights the role of husbands, fathers, families and the wider community in realising their 
basic rights around RMNCH-N services. The first of these dramas was aired on prime-time 
in early 2017 and attracted an audience of over 4 million viewers. 
 
Entertainment-education has a long history in South Asia, with shows such as Hum Log (We 
People) in 1980s India, and Nijaat (Liberation) in 1990s Pakistan, attracting large audiences 
especially among women. Nonetheless, a focus on accountability and raising citizens’ voice 
for improved service delivery marks something of a new direction for such shows in 
Pakistan. To help produce these shows, the project is working with nine universities to 
embed the curriculum in their film school courses. Indeed, an important contribution of EVA 
is its ongoing efforts to insert accountability politics into the minds of entertainment-
education scriptwriters.  
 
Whilst these efforts are arguably innovative in their own right, EVA’s network of religious 
leaders begins from the premise that men often decide when women seek RMNCH-N 
services and when they may organise to demand improvements at local facilities. However, 
they also cite religious leaders as among the most credible sources of information within 
their communities. Thus, rather than trying to challenge this reality within the project’s 
lifespan, EVA has built a network of religious leaders that can spread its messages around 
accountable health services to men during Friday sermons.22 To date, the religious leaders 
which EVA has engaged with have disseminated rights and entitlements to RMNCH-N 
services to over 126,000 men.  
 
At the time of writing, the network comprises a central council in the nation’s capital, 
Islamabad, and bodies at the district level that are connected to the DAFs and that can exert 
influence over the sermons delivered by local level prayer leaders. Furthermore, it contains 
representatives of all the major Islamic sects in the country and includes authorities from 
Pakistan’s powerful religious political parties. This lends the network significant legitimacy 
and positions it to play a high-level advocacy role as EVA evolves. It also enables it to play a 
potentially central role in creating an enabling environment by challenging the social norms 
that underpin men’s acceptance of poor service delivery. 
 
9  Adaptive, politically smart and locally led 
programming 
 
A growing movement among development practitioners has called for a rethink of how the 
political determinants of governance failures are tackled (Devarajan and Khemani 2016).23 It 
begins from studies that find top-down donor driven reform projects often incentivise 
recipient states to mimic donors’ preferred institutional forms without adopting the attendant 
mind-sets (Pritchett et al. 2010; Andrews 2012). Whilst rarely delivering the desired results, it 
is acknowledged that this can also crowd out novel domestic solutions to poor governance. 
For many, part of the remedy is a renewed focus on ‘adaptive’, ‘politically smart’ and ‘locally 
led’ projects (Booth and Unsworth 2014; Wild et al. 2015; Mercy Corps and IRC 2016). 
 
                                                 
21  Wilkins et al. (2014) provide a good introduction. 
22  Much of the thinking around this intervention came from staff members’ experiences working on the Family 
Advancement for Life and Health (FALAH) project implemented by the Pakistan Initiative for Mothers and 
Newborns (PAIMAN) and funded by USAID. It worked with religious leaders to increase the uptake of, and access to, 
family planning services (Mir and Shaikh 2013). 
23  See also The DDD Manifesto Community (n.d.). 
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At the strategic level, the suggestion is that bundling technical knowledge and conditional 
financial assistance together in top-down institutional reform packages should be 
abandoned. Instead, a renewed emphasis on helping citizens in, albeit often fragile, 
democracies to hold their governments to account is advocated. This involves enabling them 
to scrutinise services, demand their rights and to have a say in what counts as 
developmental problems or legitimate reforms. At the operational level, it is argued that 
projects that outline work plans, budgets and personnel inputs upfront can constrain 
practitioners’ space to adapt to emerging lessons from the field, or to support citizens to 
seize opportunities to drive desired changes as they arise. Instead, implementers must have 
the flexibility to allow technical leadership and local expertise to shape projects in real-time. 
Such an approach also suggests they must develop novel mechanisms for demonstrating 
impact in collaboration with donors. 
 
It is notable that proponents of this way of working often argue that the citizens closest to the 
actors and institutions responsible for service delivery are best placed to identify the 
enablers and obstacles to accountability in any given context. Furthermore, they are more 
likely to act collectively, to form relationships with powerholders, and to challenge the status 
quo if they have a say in which problems to tackle. Such an approach, however, requires 
projects to foster learning through repeated cycles of trial and error; with failures accepted as 
part of an iterative process of discovery.24 And it necessitates a hard-nosed realism as to 
what may be possible, and when, given the way power is spread within each society (Kelsall 
et al. 2016). Lastly, in many contexts, outsiders must be willing to work at ‘arm’s length’ so as 
not to delegitimise the actors and processes supporting accountability (Booth 2013).25 
 
Although the contours of this way of doing development are still emerging, the remainder of 
this paper seeks to illustrate how these general principles are being operationalised by EVA. 
Thus, it examines how the project’s inception, ongoing management and relationship with 
DFID facilitates it to be adaptive, politically smart, and locally led. Given that the programme 
still has two years ahead of it, it is hoped that this exploration provides lessons for EVA going 
forward and guidance for those interested in these ‘new’ ways of working.26 
 
10  EVA’s early challenges 
 
EVA was, in part, born from the recommendations from the final review of PHNP’s precursor 
programme (TRF 2010). Yet, compared to traditional service provision or behavioural 
change projects, citizen-led social accountability is a relatively new idea among Pakistan’s 
development practitioners.27 Indeed, only in recent years has it been tried to varying degrees 
of scale and success across different sectors. Furthermore, it is arguable that DFID’s 
flagship work on accountability in Pakistan has long been the Punjab’s top-down Education 
Reform Roadmap, which relies on monitoring data produced by the government and the 
keen interest taken in the sector by the CM (Barber 2013). At the same time, the country’s 
evolving security situation has narrowed the space for projects working directly with citizens 
in recent years. As will be shown in this section, these factors created several early 
challenges for the project. 
 
                                                 
24  In many respects, this way of working adopts the principles and mantras, such as ‘fail hard, fail fast’, common to the 
world of start-ups and entrepreneurs.   
25  For more on this see The Sidekick Manifesto (n.d.). 
26  One of the oft heard rejoinders to proponents of both social accountability and adaptive, politically smart, locally led 
approaches to development is that practitioners have long known about the need for the former and long practiced 
the latter. True though this may be, this paper holds that further case studies that remind us of the worth of the 
general principles and approaches for implementing them, remain useful.  
27  Bano (2012) provides a good introduction to the evolution of Pakistan’s third sector and donors’ involvement. See 
also Shah (2014). 
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To build a strategic model of social accountability and foster an enabling environment for its 
activities, EVA’s team blends staff with backgrounds in both the state and private health 
sectors with veteran third sector workers familiar with politics and issue based activism. It 
also includes communications experts experienced in sensitively addressing difficult social 
issues. Initial meetings of this diverse team were understandably difficult. It could even be 
argued that there was something of a clash of cultures, with members viewing the problem 
of poor service delivery through their own lenses.  
 
Key to overcoming this were a series of theory of change and strategic review workshops in 
which team members had the opportunity to think through the causes of poor service 
provision, and to debate the merits of different approaches to civic mobilisation and 
empowerment. Although heated, over time they united around a shared understanding of 
how their project differed from and could build upon previous or current interventions, 
including where opportunities may arise as Pakistan continues its democratising project. 
Indeed, regularly challenging their theory of change has become an important part of the 
team’s efforts to ensure EVA remains relevant to its fluid context.  
 
Nonetheless, from early on the team had to confront the difficulties of working in Pakistan. 
For example, it took many more months than envisioned for the project implementer, 
Palladium, to be granted registration as a company in Pakistan. This delayed the payment of 
sub-contractors, staff and suppliers. Furthermore, flooding and security operations in Punjab 
made visiting some districts difficult. This affected early stakeholder mapping exercises and 
the team’s ability to meet members of the provincial government identified as ‘gatekeepers’ 
to reforms. Perhaps most troubling, at the end of the inception phase and again at the end of 
the first year, three EVA consortium member organisations were asked to cease operations 
in Pakistan during state authorities’ crack-downs on international development organisations. 
This required the project to undertake several rounds of re-hiring to address the resulting 
skill and knowledge gaps.  
 
Adding to these challenges, EVA’s inception strategy was initially poorly received by newly 
appointed advisors in DFID Pakistan. On the one hand, they were keen for EVA to highlight 
the positive work the provincial governments were doing in the sector; rather than its ability 
to apply bottom-up pressure for further improvements. Whilst on the other, they viewed the 
programme through the lens of a behavioural change initiative; rather than an empowerment 
project. This perhaps points to the difficulty of introducing social accountability to sector 
specialists used to focusing on achieving pre-specified aims through top-down technical 
interventions. Nonetheless, such disconnects were bridged through the formation of strong 
working relationships between EVA’s senior management and key DFID staff supportive of 
this relatively new approach to Pakistan’s health sector.  
 
A fortuitous delay in the finalisation of its contract gave EVA extra time to find its feet. 
Accordingly, it conducted on-the-ground research and consultations, further testing the 
assumptions underpinning its theory of change. Project staff also made a visit to the highly 
successful DFID-funded ‘Poorest Areas Civil Society Programme’ in India to learn from its 
mobilisation and empowerment strategy.28 Most importantly, however, the social 
accountability and health experts within EVA’s own team used this opportunity to further 
reconcile their different approaches, and to get to grips with the merits of social 
accountability for addressing political obstacles to poor service provision. 
 
This led to an expansion and rethink of how the project could leverage the local knowledge 
and skills of its community groups. For example, it was decided to have community groups 
represented in the DAFs to give them a voice at the district level. This joined-up or vertically 
integrated approach to monitoring and advocacy enables EVA to demonstrate to senior 
                                                 
28  See www.pacsindia.org/  
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powerholders that the demands it raises come from active communities; as opposed to a 
well-meaning but ultimately irrelevant donor organisation. It also allows issues that require 
managerial or policy changes to be debated at higher levels of the provinces’ governance 
architectures. As the project has evolved, this has become increasingly central to its efforts 
to institutionalise accountability relationships. 
 
 
11  Adapting to the context 
 
Responsiveness to research, evidence and emerging opportunities from the field is a key 
principle of adaptive and politically smart programming. Indeed, projects must be willing and 
able to adjust their course in line with their understandings of both what is needed in each 
context, and the political enablers and obstacles to any desired change.29 At the same time, 
they must encourage and support bottom-up solutions to the problems they face. An early 
example of how EVA has sought to mainstream this way of working concerns seven district-
based consultations (DBCs) that it carried out to ‘take the pulse’ of local communities in its 
first year.30  
 
With over 700 participants, each two-hour session gave ordinary citizens, journalists, civil 
society representatives and health professionals a chance to discuss their issues and 
frustrations. It was quickly found that participants were concerned with the physical state of 
local facilities, their poor coverage, the absence of staff, charging for medicine, and common 
illnesses, such as diarrhoea. The DBCs’ host described this reality as ‘the daily grind of 
diseases’.31 However, the sessions also revealed that most participants’ linked poor services 
to politics. Indeed, the consensus was that outside of elections, politicians do not care about 
local health services. This meant the events were often highly politicised, with various 
groups blaming one another’s political patrons. This is perhaps unsurprising as in many 
districts there have historically been few opportunities for citizens to air their grievances.  
 
Early in its inception phase EVA had planned to do much of its advocacy through community 
FM radio stations. However, lessons from the DBCs and other analyses of secondary data 
were used to re-orientate the project towards opportunities for citizens to engage state 
authorities. Moreover, they were instrumental in EVA’s development of a social 
accountability model that communicates citizens’ voices upwards to higher authorities.  
This research-led and adaptive approach has been maintained as the project matures. For 
example, in 2016 it was decided by community group and DAF leaders in KP that ‘District 
Core Committees’ comprised of around five influential representatives – those connected to 
local government representatives – should be formed. They were tasked with following up on 
demands raised by community groups and strengthening EVA’s relationship with local 
government bodies. This was considered by project participants to be particularly important 
as these bodies had recently been accorded their own pools of development funding as part 
of the province’s fiscal devolution initiative.  
 
Since this bottom-up innovation, EVA’s project team has supported these groups with PEAs 
focused on the interests of local government representatives in its districts. It is also notable 
that the demands and issues satisfactorily resolved after this approach was introduced, 
account for nearly half of the total resolved in the projects’ previous two years. Put another 
                                                 
29  Again, whilst such a statement may seem like common-sense to some readers, it is common knowledge among 
development practitioners that once begun, projects are often constrained by the dictates of log frames and the 
‘results agenda’. For example, see Ramalingam (2011).  
30  For more on such efforts see Palladium (2016b). 
31  The sessions were hosted by Talat Hussain, a well-known Pakistani journalist working for the popular Geo news 
channel and a long-time advocate for marginalised communities’ welfare during flood relief efforts. 
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way, there was a 430 per cent increase in the proportion of demands resolved during the 
project’s first year and a half. In this sense, the Committees represent a locally led and 
contextually appropriate adaptation to on-the-ground political realities. 
 
The focus on local governments in KP has also led to EVA being invited to help three of its 
district governments to develop ‘Health Visions’. These plans include discussions around the 
district’s health priorities and future allocation of resources. Through such opportunities, 
EVA’s DAF members have secured commitments that some of the devolved funding will be 
targeted towards the resolution of demands raised by EVA’s community groups and DAFs.  
 
In a further encouraging development, EVA, working closely with DFID and TRF+, also 
persuaded the government of KP to include the resolution of 40 per cent of the demands 
raised by its community groups within its own 2016 DLIs (see Box 1.1). Project staff argue 
that the aforementioned district level success stories were instrumental in creating an ‘echo-
chamber’ that helped secure this agreement from provincial authorities. At the same time, 
following extensive talks, a ‘Patients’ Rights Charter’ outlining behavioural standards for staff 
at health facilities has been developed by EVA from its participants’ feedback and adopted 
by KP’s Health Care Commission. It gives citizens a set of regulations to refer to when 
making formal complaints or demands. At present, EVA is working with the Commission and 
Department of Health on ways to mainstream it throughout the entire province.  
 
These successes illustrate how state–society synergy at the local level, a joined-up 
approach among the PHNP implementers, and a collaborative relationship between EVA 
project staff and senior government officials can create the room for, and legitimise, new 
accountability mechanisms. 
 
Since it has begun, EVA has also sought ways of increasing and sustaining the impact of its 
efforts to create a wider enabling environment for accountability. For example, its 
collaboration with nine universities has led to a further previously unplanned initiative to 
assist them to establish entertainment-education courses. At the time of this research, 
lecturers have been trained in the curriculum with inputs from media industry professionals 
and EVA commissioned experts, and four of the institutions have since started teaching the 
course. The course capitalises upon a growing public appetite within Pakistan for 
entertainment to explore and discuss sensitive issues, including the political causes of poor 
service provision. The project is also in discussions with well-known Pakistani academic 
institutions about the possibility of instituting EVA’s rights-based journalism curriculum. 
These efforts have the potential to leave behind lasting structures that will support 
accountability after EVA formally ends. 
 
Recently, through a combination of pressure from EVA’s PAF and through project staffs’ 
direct advocacy, KP’s long-awaited Primary Care Management Committees (PCMSs) have 
been put on notice to begin work. In support, EVA has committed to develop terms of 
reference for the PCMCs and a ‘training of trainers’ programme for their members. The idea 
is to impart the principles, practices and tools of EVA’s own community groups to these new 
quasi-governmental citizens’ bodies. EVA also plans to adapt its community monitoring 
checklist for their use and to link the committees directly to the KP’s IMU. This is key to 
ensuring service users’ perspectives continue to be incorporated into the decision-making of 
the government’s own oversight body. 
 
Before moving on, it is worth briefly comparing the project’s experiences in Punjab and KP. 
In short, Punjab has proved a much more difficult context for EVA’s model of social 
accountability. This can be attributed to four factors: the evolving security situation in south 
Punjab, the centralisation of power around the CM’s office and the frequent appointment of 
new Health Secretaries, politically motivated delays in the provinces’ fiscal devolution plans, 
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and the sub-contracting of the management of BHUs to private organisations in EVA’s 
project districts.  
 
Box 11.1: Civil society schools 
Although KP has begun to devolve fiscal powers to local government bodies, Punjab is yet to do 
so. Thus, its community groups have found it more difficult to secure funds for local projects. Many 
have used skills and lessons learned through EVA to pursue other means to address their 
demands. 
 
For example, in Lahore a community group collected the funding needed for an ultrasound 
machine. Whilst in Sahiwal, a group raised the money to install solar panels at their local BHU. In 
an example of innovation, another community group in Lahore persuaded a local petrol station to 
share its electricity with their BHU. 
 
In conservative KP, female community group members have held discussions with local elders to 
discuss the importance of women voting. In response, the elders of the area called a grand 
meeting/Jirga after which they declared that women may cast their vote. Whilst in Peshawar, 
members managed to re-open a closed school by persuading the local community to enrol their 
daughters for classes. 
 
Whilst not the primary aim of EVA, such activities are at the core of the idea of civil society, which 
emphasises the importance of self-help where the state is unable or unwilling to listen to citizens’ 
demands. 
 
Each of these challenges requires EVA to continuously try what could be termed new ‘micro-
strategies’ at the local and district levels, and to find innovative ways of cultivating 
relationships with influential powerholders at the provincial level. For example, as opposed to 
waiting for fiscal devolution of the sort seen in KP, the Punjab community groups and DAFs 
are devoting more time to engaging philanthropists as possible patrons of local health 
services or undertaking development projects themselves. Furthermore, some community 
groups have put their organisational and advocacy skills to other, non-project related, ends 
(see Box 11.1). In this sense, it could be said that even where they struggle to link with state 
authorities, EVA’s forums act as civil society schools, empowering their members to resolve 
different issues through a range of methods. 
 
To address obstacles at the provincial level, EVA has carried out research that demonstrates 
how money spent on local monitoring and connecting citizens to their BHUs saves the 
Health Department funds in the long run. The results have recently been presented to a 
newly appointed Health Secretary who was initially sceptical of the project’s worth.32 Despite 
the evident difficulties of working in varied and challenging contexts such as Pakistan, such 
efforts are arguably the ‘stuff’ of adaptive programming and they should be taken as a sign 
that EVA remains pragmatic. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32  For more on the difficulty of working in the Punjab see Palladium (2016c). 
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12  The foundations of EVA’s approach 
 
Beginning with PEA, moving onto financial management and ending with the project’s 
working relationship with DFID, this section overviews the foundations of EVA’s approach to 
adaptive, politically smart and locally led programming (see Box 12.1). It is intended to be of 
benefit to similar projects in challenging environments.  
 
The importance of mainstreaming regular PEAs that test projects’ theories of change and 
explore pathways to desired outcomes are a major concern of the literature (Harris and 
Booth 2013; SAVI 2014). Acknowledging this, EVA began with a sectoral PEA conducted by 
technical assistance, and currently carries out bi-annual provincial and more frequent district 
level analyses. As it has evolved, EVA has taken steps to involve its community groups, DAF 
members and state officials in these activities. Indeed, it views them as embedded local 
experts. The resulting findings are shared among the DAFs’ wider memberships. Proving 
their worth, they have shaped the thinking behind the formation of the District Core 
Committees in KP and identified the fragmentation of power at the district level in Punjab as 
a significant obstacle to responsive governance.  
 
Beyond these more formal dissemination processes, EVA’s staff describe PEA as a ‘living 
process’ that takes place between themselves, citizens and state officials. Indeed, they view 
discussions about the obstacles or enablers to accountability as an essential element of their 
approach. Whilst this may seem par-for-the-course for practitioners working in other 
contexts, it is notable that in Pakistan frank and open discussions of the causes of poor 
services and the nature of local solutions have sometimes been circumscribed by donors 
fearful of the consequences. For example, anecdotal evidence suggests that this has led 
past DFID projects to avoid engaging Pakistan’s religious leaders and political parties, and to 
shy away from challenging patronage networks linked to senior government officials. As 
illustrated earlier, EVA’s efforts to build a network of religious leaders and the opportunities 
its PAFs afford senior politicians and citizens to engage one with another suggest that it is, 
albeit carefully and selectively, disrupting such ways of working. 
 
Box 12.1: EVA’s approach 
 Mainstreaming regular PEAs: For EVA, this includes involving its participants – whom it 
views as local experts – in its analyses and drawing upon up-to-date information gathered in  
ad hoc meetings with stakeholders.   
 Thickening not scaling up: EVA believes that it is more important to build its presence within 
the localities it works, taking the time to understand its context, than it is to scale up.  
 Flexible budgeting is key to adaptability: As with other programmes, EVA has found that 
flexible budgeting enables it to react to the fluid political landscape and emerging lessons from 
the field. 
 The importance of coordination: EVA has benefited from its working relationship with its 
DFID country office. This has been particularly important for granting the project the initial ‘buy-
in’ from stakeholders. 
 Innovative demonstrations of impact: To move beyond viewing impact as the number of 
demands raised and resolved, EVA has developed a number of innovative ways to 
demonstrate its impact. These include a series of tracer studies mapped onto the theory of 
change and case studies documenting the key approaches of the project. 
 
It should also be noted that EVA has purposely fought against scaling up (or more accurately 
horizontally) too quickly. Thus, it has confined itself to nine districts across KP and Punjab, 
only moving to new ones when it is confident that its evolving model is somewhat 
transplantable. This bucks the traditional donor imperative and has led to some confusion 
among stakeholders as to EVA’s limited size compared to its costs. Nonetheless, this 
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phased roll-out has allowed EVA to keep abreast of the political situations in the areas it 
works. It has also enabled it to concentrate on reaching as many citizens as possible within 
each locality and on connecting them to influential civil society members that can raise their 
voices. One way of interpreting this approach is that EVA is engaged in thickening its 
presence on the ground, rather creating more loosely connected and unsustainable 
networks that have characterised past projects in Pakistan. 
 
In their recent paper, Derbyshire and Donovan (2016) identify the flexibility of projects’ 
financial management processes as central to supporting adaptive ways of working. Perhaps 
most importantly, projects that seek to empower citizens and to react to opportunities as they 
arise, especially in their first year or so, need to be able to call upon short-term technical 
assistance, and to realign their staffing and activity streams to accord with new directions. 
However, as EVA must follow DFID’s mainstream financial forecasting procedures, staff 
argue that the structure of their budget was crucial to gaining such flexibility. By organising 
their technical support budget into milestone payments and, thereby, taking on the risk, EVA 
effectively created a pool of funds with which to quickly and efficiently identify, recruit and 
deploy technical assistance.  
 
It’s worth was aptly demonstrated early on when several DAFs made it clear that they 
required more support and training to engage in direct advocacy with powerholders. The 
pool allowed EVA to rapidly engage experts that could develop a contextually appropriate 
advocacy toolkit. Similarly, when the opportunity arose, the project could offer technical 
assistance to the KP’s Chief Minister Initiative to expand its social protection programme for 
maternal health services to poor and marginalised communities. Although not directly 
concerned with the accountability of health services, this strengthened EVA’s relationships 
with provincial level authorities and the Minister of Health, who are central to the project’s 
ability to work in KP. Reflecting on this, EVA’s Technical Manager argues that this pool of 
flexible funds has been the backbone of their approach to adaptive and, in some cases, 
politically smart management. 
 
The EVA team’s strong working relationships with its counterparts in DFID have also been 
central to its evolution. Indeed, they have enabled it to communicate the extent to which the 
project’s work is often determined by political opportunity structures beyond its control and, 
when required, to seek help.33 For example, during its first year, EVA struggled to secure 
permission from Pakistan’s security agencies to carry out a baseline survey in KP. This 
required the project to work closely with DFID to persuade officials of its benign intentions. 
DFID has also played an active role in brokering some of EVA’s key relationships with 
stakeholders, including Punjab’s PSPU and KP’s IMU. This has proved crucial for securing 
the initial buy-in from powerholders, unused to being challenged by civil society. 
 
Recognising the problem of attribution in ongoing and locally led social accountability efforts, 
DFID has also encouraged EVA to demonstrate its impact in novel ways. In the early 
phases, this has been done through the relaying of ‘success stories’ that detail how its model 
has overcome local obstacles to civic mobilisation and elicited responses from health 
authorities. However, at DFID’s urging, these stories are being complimented by value for 
money analysis which aims to quantify the economic impact of successfully resolved 
demands on households, using a version of the ‘disability adjusted life years’ formula and 
the World Bank’s cost effectiveness calculations.34 As the project moves forward, such 
methods will be crucial to telling the long-term story of EVA’s model of social accountability. 
 
 
                                                 
33  For Tarrow (1998: 19), political opportunity structures are ‘changes in opportunities that lower the costs of collective 
action, reveal potential allies and show where elites and authorities are vulnerable’. 
34  ‘Disability adjusted life years’ is a measure of overall disease burden, usually expressed as the number of years lost 
due to ill-health, disability or early death.  
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13  Lessons for the wider social accountability 
field 
 
So far, this paper has outlined EVA’s strategic approach to fostering social accountability in 
Pakistan’s health sector and explored how it seeks to be adaptive, politically smart and 
locally led. It has also highlighted many of the areas in which the project has cemented 
strong structures or had successes with the potential to create sustainable changes in state–
society relationships. However, thinking more broadly about EVA’s experiences to date, it is 
possible to draw out emerging issues that may be of interest to the wider social 
accountability field.  
 
Firstly, social accountability projects should be partially judged on their 
understanding of and adaptation to power and politics. Indeed, empowerment and the 
establishment of accountability relationships that cross state-society divides are processes 
unsuited to 3–5-year project windows. On the one hand, empowerment is not merely a case 
of training citizens in the use of accountability tools or the skills of activists; it also requires 
the self-confidence to raise one’s voice that comes from repeated interactions with 
powerholders and the state. Whilst on the other, forming relationships between civil society 
and authorities at multiple levels of the state’s governance architecture is a complex and 
time-consuming undertaking that is prone to setbacks or dead-ends. As seen with EVA, this 
raises the problem of projects that are under pressure to produce tangible results, yet that 
may struggle to do so until well into their lifecycles.   
 
One emerging way of addressing this is for projects to make the case that PEAs, particularly 
those focussed on the sub-national localities they work in and institutions they intend to 
engage, should be part of their results framework. Such an approach would allow projects to 
take the complexity of national and local political settlements in countries such as Pakistan 
seriously, whilst affording donors a way of ensuring that the lessons from rigorous PEAs are 
mainstreamed into projects’ activities. This could include regular feedback sessions within 
which programmes communicate their findings to donors who otherwise may struggle to 
understand the sector specific obstacles or fast changing contexts they face. Such 
considerations speak to the importance of social accountability programmes being twinned 
with advisory teams in donors’ country offices that have a knowledge of both the politics of 
accountability in host countries, and the sector or field a project works in.  
 
Secondly, further flexibility is needed in how social accountability projects report 
results. This should enable programmes to account for situations in which they find 
themselves blocked from their original aims or when they seize unexpected opportunities. As 
demonstrated by the difficulties EVA has faced in the Punjab due to the province’s stalled 
fiscal devolution and frequent political repostings, this could take the form of donors 
refocussing on projects’ unintended outcomes. Indeed, done well, bottom-up social 
accountability programmes are likely to have significant spill-over effects as mobilised 
citizens use their skills and confidence to tackle problems outside of the programmes’ 
original remits. It is notable that following a recent field visit, DFID Pakistan’s Head of Office 
commented that ‘one of EVA’s most important contributions may be what it achieves through 
its spill-over effects’.35 In this sense, efforts to capture what happens unexpectedly or on the 
margins of programmes should be accorded additional weight in how they are evaluated. 
That said, it is reasonable to expect projects to take the lead on demonstrating positive 
impacts to donors. 
    
                                                 
35  Pers comm., as relayed to EVA staff by the DFID SRO assigned to the project. 
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Thirdly, social accountability projects can involve themselves in and contribute to 
horizontal accountability. Indeed, in many young democracies in-fighting between different 
factions within incumbent governments can translate into turf wars between state institutions. 
Social accountability projects that seek to engage the state at multiple levels of governance 
are likely to come up against such fissures and fractures. EVA suggests, however, that there 
may be a greater role for projects that are willing to provide forums for such contests to play 
out in. For example, project forums could consciously portray themselves as neutral venues 
for engagements between government officials. Furthermore, data produced by projects 
could be used by reform-minded politicians or the media to shape governments’ internal 
discourses around particular issues. Nonetheless, getting involved in such battles will likely 
require a delicate balance of open and honest relationships between stakeholders and 
project staff, with the latter willing and able to work behind the scenes so as to avoid being 
perceived as partisan. Such work would add another layer of meaning and complexity to 
‘politically savvy’ programming. 
 
Fourthly, where appropriate, social accountability projects should look to collaborate 
with other donor initiatives and to leverage their political capital. Led by the World 
Bank, accountability and transparency are experiencing something of a renaissance within 
the development community (Grandvoinnet et al. 2015; World Bank 2016). At the same time, 
however, donor countries such as the UK, Canada and Australia are increasingly looking to 
integrate their aid departments and budgets with other arms of their states’ foreign focused 
apparatus, including diplomatic missions, trade departments and private investment efforts. 
This presents both challenges and opportunities for social accountability projects.  
 
On the one hand, it will be increasingly difficult for projects to portray themselves as 
independent from their donor states’ wider political aims. This could be particularly 
problematic for those in states such as Pakistan where powerholders have long been 
suspicious of outsiders’ intentions. On the other, closer coordination between different arms 
of donor governments could be harnessed to apply targeted pressure to stakeholders within 
host nations. For example, political capital accrued by diplomatic missions could be 
deployed to link social accountability projects, including their representatives within civil 
society, to otherwise disinterested powerholders. Or donors’ relationships with private sector 
organisations within host nations could be leveraged to add to the ‘echo-chamber’ effect 
thought to be instrumental to pushing through controversial reforms. These are difficult and 
context specific strategies that will likely require significant understandings of one another’s 
aims to be developed between projects and their potential allies. 
 
Lastly, strategic social accountability projects should not be afraid to politicise 
specific issues by placing them in the public discourse. This includes thinking of 
projects as efforts to support citizens to renegotiate the host country’s social contracts 
around particular public goods. It is arguable, however, that if these grand ambitions are to 
be realised, donors may have to gravitate away from understanding projects as bounded 
interventions, measurable in terms of demands raised and resolved, or even accountability 
mechanisms institutionalised. Instead, it may be necessary to think of social accountability 
efforts as aimed at building social movements.36 At present there are few blueprints on what 
such a shift would entail, and the literature from Pakistan and elsewhere suggests that 
donors are as likely to harm the social movements they engage, as they are to help them 
(Bano 2012; Jalali 2013). Nonetheless, this seems the logical next step for those interested 
in securing locally led and sustainable change. 
 
  
                                                 
36  Tarrow (1998: 4) has defined social movements as ‘collective challenges, based on common purposes and social 
solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities’. 
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14  Conclusion 
 
This paper has sought to provide a snapshot of EVA’s evolving model of social 
accountability. It has argued that this model accords with what Fox (2015) labels a ‘strategic’ 
approach. Thus, instead of a singular focus on the tools of accountability, it deploys multiple 
tactics, works at numerous levels of governance and seeks to coordinate citizens’ voice with 
ongoing reform efforts. More widely, it aims to foster an enabling environment for the re-
negotiation of Pakistan’s social contract around health services. To do this, EVA has sought 
to be adaptive, politically smart and locally led; this has required it to consistently question its 
theory of change, and to react to lessons from the field and emerging political developments. 
Despite the relative newness of social accountability projects in Pakistan, EVA has been 
supported to do this by its counterparts in DFID and the wider PHNP framework. Together 
they have enabled the project to build structures and relationships that span the state-
society divide, and to create re-occurring opportunities for citizens to engage powerholders 
and to demand their rights and entitlements. Although practitioners must remain mindful of 
the nature of the context, these achievements hold lessons for similar projects seeking to 
operationalise adaptive and politically smart approaches to social accountability. 
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